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ARTICLES 
 
IMPROVING REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
AT INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
CARY COGLIANESE* 
Independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications 
Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange 
Commission—regularly issue highly consequential regulations.  When they issue 
their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for 
analysis that apply to other agencies.  Consequently, courts, policymakers, and 
scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality 
prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies.  These agencies’ 
track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar 
concerns.  In this Article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at 
independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current quality and 
offering possible solutions Congress could adopt to improve these agencies’ 
regulatory analysis.  I present three options for improving prospective analysis 
by independent agencies:  (1) continuing to allow courts to encourage better 
analysis; (2) subjecting independent agencies to the same White House review 
that currently applies to executive agencies; and (3) amending the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) to impose a requirement for analysis but not 
                                               
 * Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, and 
Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am 
grateful for assistance provided by Laurent Abergel, Justin Berg, and Kelly 
Funderburk, as well as John Boulé, Laura Collins, Jody A. Stafford, and other members 
of the staff of the American University Law Review.  This Article builds on testimony 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management.  See Reviewing 
Independent Agency Rulemaking:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. 
Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 79 (2016) 
(statement of Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Director, Penn 
Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania). 
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White House review.  The UMRA option would best balance the desire to 
improve independent agencies’ prospective regulatory analysis with the 
prevailing norms of autonomy that surround these agencies.  In addition to 
improving prospective analysis, independent agencies should seek to produce 
more rigorous retrospective analysis of their existing regulations, both to improve 
the substantive performance of their existing regulations and to learn better what 
to expect when analyzing new regulations.  I thus offer options for improving 
retrospective analysis by independent agencies, each of which could be adopted 
without undermining autonomy norms.  Ultimately, to improve independent 
regulatory agencies’ performance in fulfilling their public missions, these 
agencies’ leaders must make smarter regulatory decisions—and the first step 
toward smarter decisions lies with improving regulatory analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifteen years, a group of seventeen major independent 
agencies—including the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—collectively issued 
nearly 5000 federal regulations.1  Yet not one of these rules has been 
                                               
 1. The Paperwork Reduction Act defines “independent regulatory agency” by 
listing nineteen federal agencies: 
[T]he Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the 
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subject to the usual legislative or presidential requirements for 
regulatory analysis that executive branch agencies must follow when 
developing new rules.2  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
and Executive Order 12,866 exempt independent agencies from the 
normal requirements for regulatory impact analysis.3  Perhaps not 
surprisingly then, over forty percent of major regulations from 
independent agencies reportedly lack any information on the anticipated 
costs or benefits of these new rules.4 
To be sure, all agencies could improve their analysis of regulations, but 
regulatory scholars and commentators have raised particular concern in 
                                               
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine 
Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission, the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, the Office of Financial Research, [and] Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency . . . . 
44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).  A search in the Federal Register using Lexis yielded 4848 
final rules issued by these listed agencies from 2002 to 2016.  The search yielded no 
final rules issued by two of these agencies:  Interstate Commerce Commission (which 
no longer exists) and the Office of Financial Research. 
 2. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012) (mandating that executive branch agencies that seek 
to develop a rule which may result in the private-sector expenditure of $100 million or 
more annually prepare an analysis of the anticipated benefits and costs of the rule); 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. 
at 802–06 (establishing principles and procedures for executive branch agencies to 
conduct benefit-cost analyses of new rules and subject them to review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs).  Executive Order 12,866, adopted by President 
William J. Clinton, was reaffirmed by President Barack Obama in Exec. Order No. 
13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–
17.  President Donald J. Trump has retained both executive orders. 
 3. UMRA’s definition of an agency “does not include independent regulatory 
agencies.”  2 U.S.C. § 658(1) (2012), incorporated by 2 U.S.C. § 1502.  The agencies 
covered by Executive Order 12,866 are those covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act 
“other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies.”  Exec. Order 
No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 641. 
 4. The Office of Management and Budget analyzed major regulations that 
thirteen independent agencies issued between 2005 and 2014 and found that only 
eighty-four out of 143 major regulations (fifty-nine percent) issued by those 
independent agencies contained at least some information about costs or benefits—a 
necessary but quite minimal criterion for sound analysis.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES 
REFORM ACT 97–98, app. c (2015) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf. 
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recent years about weak or insufficient analysis at independent regulatory 
agencies.5  The emergence of such concern seemed to coincide with 
much more active and consequential regulatory agendas at a number of 
major independent agencies during the Obama Administration, as 
illustrated by the FCC’s 2015 adoption of an “Open Internet” regulation6 
and the SEC’s and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
(CFTC) promulgation of major new regulations under the 2010 Dodd-
Frank financial reform legislation.7  Litigants, as well as some judges and 
commentators, have criticized independent regulators for failing to 
produce adequate analysis before adopting new regulations, with courts 
remanding some agencies’ rules for further analysis.8 
                                               
 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the 
Administrative State:  The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 549 
(2017) (providing case studies that “illustrate the shortcomings of independent agencies 
with respect to cost-benefit analysis”); Joseph P. Mohorovic, Improving Regulatory Analysis at 
Independent Agencies, REG. REV. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/ 
01/10/mohorovic-improving-regulatory-analysis-independent-agencies (observing 
that “too often I have seen [the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)] depart 
from . . . analytical best practices, which then can lead to misinformed and even unnecessary 
regulations” and arguing that “the kind of cost-benefit analysis required of executive branch 
agencies would lead to better rules at CPSC and other independent agencies”). 
 6. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. pt. 8 (2015) (codifying rules 
promulgated by the FCC in response to the net-neutrality debate).  The FCC subsequently 
repealed this order after President Donald J. Trump was elected and appointed a new chair 
of the FCC.  FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom (Dec. 14, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/ 
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db1214/DOC-348261A1.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Final Rules, Final Guidance, Final Exemptive Orders, and Other Final 
Actions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/ 
DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinalRules/ index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing 
the CFTC’s seventy-nine finalized rules, orders, and guidance actions under the Dodd-
Frank Act); Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (detailing the final rules adopted by the SEC under the sixty-seven 
mandatory rulemaking provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 8. For recent litigation raising challenges to independent financial regulators’ 
analyses, see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity 
Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 384, 390, 
437–38, (D.D.C. 2014); Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 190 (D.D.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 720 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 877 F. 
Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012).  Not all of these challenges, of course, have been successful.  
Litigants raised similar objections, unsuccessfully, in an action challenging the FCC’s 
decision making that led to its Open Internet Order in 2015, arguing that, as Gordon 
Crovitz has stated, “the FCC skipped the economic analysis.”  L. Gordon Crovitz, 
‘Economics-Free’ Obamanet,’ WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2016, 6:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/economics-free-obamanet-1454282427. 
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Much concern to date has focused on prospective regulatory analysis, 
which takes place before agencies adopt new regulations, informing 
decision makers about whether to proceed with new rules or how to design 
them.  But another type of analysis matters too:  retrospective analysis, which 
takes place after an agency promulgates a rule and seeks to measure its 
impacts.  Retrospective and prospective analysis are interrelated.  Prospective 
analysis clarifies the goals of a new regulation and identifies expected 
outcomes; this in turn informs the subsequent process of retrospective 
analysis by identifying benchmarks against which the regulation’s actual 
effects can be assessed.9  Conversely, when retrospective analysis shows how 
well a regulation has (or has not) worked, it informs future prospective 
analysis about whether to retain or modify that regulation, as well as how to 
design other regulations.10  Both types of analysis—prospective and 
retrospective—are essential ingredients for smart decision making about 
how to deliver high-quality regulatory outcomes.11  Although litigation and 
scholarly work has so far focused most attention on the adequacy of 
prospective analysis at independent agencies,12 no reason exists to think 
that these same agencies are doing any better than other agencies when it 
comes to evaluating their rules after the fact. 
The purpose of this Article is to gauge what we know about how 
independent agencies are performing both types of analysis and to offer 
steps that Congress might take to encourage improvements in both kinds 
of analysis at such agencies.  In this Article, I have in mind primarily the 
agencies that Congress has stipulated to be independent in its definition of 
                                               
 9. CARY COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE:  EVALUATING THE 
IMPACT OF REGULATION AND REGULATORY POLICY, Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. 
Expert Paper No. 1, at 18 (Aug. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/ 
1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZZ-NERP] [hereinafter COGLIANESE, 
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE] (observing that “whatever the criteria that are 
used in prospective impact analysis can also be used to evaluate regulations after the fact”). 
 10. Id. at 47–50 (elaborating an integrated framework for using “[e]valuation research 
[to] inform decision making about a broad range of policy relevant questions,” including 
prospective decision making about new rules). 
 11. Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental 
Policies:  Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENV’T:  SOC. 
AND BEHAVIORAL SCI. RESEARCH PRIORITIES 246, 249–52, 263 (Gary D. Brewer & Paul C. 
Stern eds., 2005); Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory 
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 116, 121–22 
(David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and 
Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1121 [hereinafter Coglianese, Empirical 
Analysis]; Cary Coglianese, Thinking Ahead, Looking Back:  Assessing the Value of Regulatory 
Impact Analysis and Procedures for its Use, 3 KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 5, 14, 23 (2013). 
 12. See supra notes 5, 8 and accompanying text; infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
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the term in the Paperwork Reduction Act,13 but I recognize that what 
constitutes an independent agency can itself be open to discussion.14  Agency 
independence has long been understood in terms of structural features 
related to the appointment of agency heads—for-cause removal restrictions, 
fixed terms, and, with multi-member agencies, bipartisan distribution 
requirements.15  Agencies with these features have generally been considered 
independent, while those lacking them are instead considered executive 
agencies, operating under the closer oversight of the White House.  More 
recently, though, some scholars have properly recognized structural 
independence as more of a matter of degree, rather than as a binary 
characteristic.16  Other commentators have acknowledged that de jure 
structural independence is but one possible, even if not always sufficient, 
means by which agency officials can make de facto independent judgments 
about how best to advance a statutory mandate and deliver public value.17 
                                               
 13. See supra note 1 (defining “independent regulatory agency” in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act by listing nineteen federal agencies). 
 14. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of 
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215. 
 15. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 257, 259 (detailing the three main structural features characteristic of 
“independent” agencies). 
 16. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2013) (arguing that agencies 
are best viewed on a sliding scale of independence from presidential influence); see 
also David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence, 
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1507 (2015) (developing “numerical estimates of agency 
independence”); CHRISTOPHER CARRIGAN & LINDSEY POOLE, STRUCTURING REGULATORS:  
THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN ON REGULATORY BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE, 
Penn Program on Reg. Research Paper, at 7 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/ 
files/4707-carriganpoole-ppr-researchpaper062015pdf (discussing “the notion that 
independence is best thought of as a continuum”). 
 17. See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING, LEARNING, LEADING:  A FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 42 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4946-
pprfinalconvenersreportpdf (noting that formal legal structures do not necessarily 
guarantee agency independence); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CREATING A 
CULTURE OF INDEPENDENCE:  PRACTICAL GUIDANCE AGAINST UNDUE INFLUENCE 9 (2017), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/creating-a-culture-of-independence_5jfxjd55fzd2.pdf? 
contentType=%2fns%2fOECDBook%2c%2fns%2fBook&itemId=%2fcontent%2fboo
k%2f9789264274198-en&mimeType=application%2fpdf&containerItemId=%2fcontent 
%2fserial%2f24151440&accessItemIds=&option6=imprint&value6=http%3a%2f%2fo
ecd.metastore.ingenta.com%2fcontent%2fimprint%2foecd (finding that the “de 
jure” independence found in legal structures does not necessarily provide the “culture 
of independence” that is necessary for regulators to function independently and 
effectively); Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J. 
ON REG. 257, 261 (2015) (arguing that the complex legal structure of the Federal Reserve, 
which was intended to balance independence and accountability, does not always serve its 
intended purpose); CARRIGAN & POOLE, supra note 16, at 4–7 (discussing how the 
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Even the independent agencies listed in the Paperwork Reduction 
Act do not uniformly share the same structural features.  Most have 
agency heads protected by for-cause removal limitations, but some do 
not (e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and 
the Office of Financial Research).18  Moreover, the Paperwork 
Reduction Act’s list does not include some agencies headed by 
administrators who do enjoy for-cause removal protection (e.g., Social 
Security Administration).19  Despite these nuances, the list of agencies 
stipulated as independent in the Paperwork Reduction Act proves 
particularly relevant to this Article’s treatment of prospective and 
retrospective regulatory analysis because existing regulatory analysis 
requirements apply to executive agencies but do not apply to agencies 
that the Paperwork Reduction Act lists as independent. 
In each of the two parts of this Article that follow, I turn first to what we 
can infer about the quality of independent agencies’ analyses, suggesting that 
it is harder than it might seem to say definitively how deficient are the analyses 
conducted at these agencies.  However, on the not-unreasonable assumption 
that independent agencies’ analyses are far from optimal in their current 
level of rigor and completeness, I next turn in each subsequent part of this 
Article to possible legislative actions that might help encourage agencies to 
improve their analysis.  I begin with prospective analysis in Part I, followed 
with a similar treatment of retrospective analysis in Part II. 
I. PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Although administrative law scholars sometimes pine for a bygone 
era when so-called informal rulemaking was truly informal20—if such a 
                                               
structure and composure of regulatory bodies impacts their effectiveness).  See generally 
Miller, supra note 14, at 215. 
 18. The OCC is located within the Department of the Treasury.  The enabling statute 
for the OCC section explicitly lacks for-cause removal protection, instead providing that 
the Comptroller of the Currency “shall hold his office for a term of five years unless sooner 
removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.”  12 
U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  The statutory provision establishing the Director of the Office of 
Financial Research lacks any provision on removal, indicating the absence of any for-cause 
protection. 12 U.S.C. § 5342(b). 
 19. Admittedly, the Paperwork Reduction Act’s enumerated list is not intended to 
be exclusive; it can encompass “any other similar agency designated by statute as a 
Federal independent regulatory agency or commission.”  44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).  
What is “similar” is hardly self-evident, given that the nineteen agencies are not 
identical in their structural features. 
 20. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (lamenting that “the bloom is off the rose” 
because “the rulemaking process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome”). 
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day ever actually existed—the process of making new regulations today 
often involves numerous procedural steps and the building of what can 
sometimes be an extensive administrative record.21  New rules are also 
always susceptible to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, which effectively compels 
agencies to justify their rules based on evidence and reasoning.22 
For the most significant new rules, administrative procedures 
demand that agency officials explicitly define the problem they seek 
to solve, offer justifications for their proposed regulations, consider 
alternatives, and estimate the anticipated benefits and costs of both 
their preferred actions and other alternatives.  UMRA and Executive 
Order 12,866 impose precisely these sorts of analytical requirements 
when agencies plan to issue rules having certain kinds of annual 
economic effects in excess of $100 million (or higher for UMRA, due 
to inflation adjustments).23  Under Executive Order 12,866, agencies 
must clear their benefit-cost analyses of new rules through the White 
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).24  The 
Executive Order further states that each agency shall “propose or 
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the 
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”25 
Statutes also contain additional analytical requirements.  The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires analysis when an agency expects a 
new rule will impose substantial impacts on small businesses.26  The 
                                               
 21. Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 533–46 (2000) (charting the source of multiple steps that 
agencies are required to take in order to engage in rulemaking). 
 22. For an agency to avoid a judicial remand under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, it must consider evidence and pay 
attention to the likely impacts of regulation when promulgating rules.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706, 2711–12 (2015); 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 31, 57 (1983).  
See generally John D. Graham & Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the Cost-Benefit State, 
REG. REV. (April 26, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/26/graham-noe-
shift-in-the-cost-benefit-state (discussing courts’ expectation that agencies consider the 
impacts of new rules and the increasing judicial receptivity to benefit-cost analysis in 
the absence of a statutory prohibition on the consideration of costs). 
 23. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2) (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 
641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06.  These requirements 
not only do not apply to less significant rules but they also do not apply to executive 
agency actions that are not formally rules but nevertheless may serve “quasi-regulatory” 
purposes.  See John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity 
without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425, 426, 445 (2014). 
 24. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 644–45. 
 25. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638–39. 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 601. 
2018] IMPROVING REGULATORY ANALYSIS 741 
Paperwork Reduction Act calls for estimates of costs and time 
associated with any paperwork requirements found in new 
regulations.27  The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
demands that federal agencies analyze the environmental impacts of 
major actions that will affect the environment.28  The Congressional 
Review Act requires agencies to report to Congress and the 
Comptroller General on new rules that would have an annual 
economic effect above the $100 million threshold and to provide a 
copy of any benefit-cost analysis prepared for those rules.29 
Procedural requirements such as these reflect the sensible 
expectation that agencies engage in analysis before adopting new 
rules.  Just as it is true in other consequential endeavors, it is better for 
regulators to look before they leap.30  Conducting prospective analysis 
can help reduce the possibility of mistakes, unintended consequences, 
and wasted resources.31 
All regulatory agencies must follow most, but not all, of the analytical 
requirements applicable to new rulemaking in statutes such as the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act and NEPA.  However, the main analytical 
requirements calling for agencies to conduct prospective benefit-cost 
analyses of major rules do not apply to independent agencies.32  The 
definition of an “agency” under UMRA “does not include independent 
                                               
 27. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3506 (2012). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 801. 
 30. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT:  THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 240 (2012) (arguing 
that “[o]ur most important policy decisions—about the economy, jobs, health care, 
defense, the environment, and foreign relations—require that smart people spend 
long periods of time thinking strategically”). 
 31. See, e.g., Susan E. Dudley, Make “Independent” Regulatory Agencies More Accountable 
to the Public, FORBES (May 9, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
susandudley/2017/05/09/make-independent-regulatory-agencies-more-accountable-
to-the-public (urging President Trump to issue an Executive Order that will require 
independent agencies to conduct impact analyses and submit proposed regulations to 
OIRA).  Even those observers who express concern over an undue emphasis on 
benefit-cost analysis in the regulatory process recognize the value in prospective 
analysis of some kind.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in its 
Place:  Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 337–38 (2011) (seeking to 
“challenge the hegemony” of benefit-cost analysis while still “favor[ing] technocratic 
analysis that measures both costs and benefits in the most accurate way possible”). 
 32. On occasion, of course, an independent agency’s organic statute may require 
it to conduct a benefit-cost analysis.  Such is the case, for instance, with the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), which must prepare a “description of the 
potential benefits and potential costs of [any new product safety] rule.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 2058(f)(2)(A) (2012). 
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regulatory agencies,”33 and the terms of Executive Order 12,866 
expressly do not apply to agencies the Paperwork Reduction Act lists 
as independent regulatory agencies.34 
As a result, it should hardly be surprising that independent regulatory 
agencies have come under considerable criticism for failing to conduct 
extensive or even adequate benefit-cost analyses of many of their rules.  
As Curtis Copeland notes in a report prepared for the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, “studies indicate that independent 
regulatory agencies often do not quantify or monetize regulatory 
benefits, and often quantify and monetize only paperwork costs.”35  
Richard Revesz observes that when it comes to producing benefit-cost 
analyses of their rules, executive agencies are “more proficient,” and 
“[t]he less successful agencies are independent and outside the 
purview of OIRA review.”36 
The evidence supporting such claims typically derives from the 
reports of new major rules and their underlying analyses that independent 
agencies submit to the Comptroller General, pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act.  For example, Copeland reports that, of twenty-two major 
rules that independent agencies issued in 2012, “[o]nly one rule 
contained any quantitative benefit information.”37  OIRA compiles this 
information in its annual reports to Congress and observes that 
“[i]ndependent agencies still have challenges in providing monetized 
estimates of benefits and costs of regulation.”38  Other commentators 
reach much the same conclusion based on similar evidence.39 
                                               
 33. 2 U.S.C. § 658(1) (2012); see also id. § 1502 (incorporating the definition in § 
658 into UMRA).  The enacted version of UMRA does not define the words “independent 
regulatory agencies,” but the conference committee report indicates that they were 
intended to mirror the definition in the Paperwork Reduction Act, the only other place 
in the U.S. Code where these words are defined.  S. REP. NO. 104-2, at 31 (1995). 
 34. Section 3(b) of the Executive Order states:  “‘Agency,’ unless otherwise 
indicated, means any authority of the United States that is an ‘agency’ under 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as 
defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10).”  Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06.  The provisions of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act have been re-numbered, so that the definition of 
independent regulatory agencies is now at 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012). 
 35. CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 4 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland 
%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf. 
 36. Revesz, supra note 5, at 560. 
 37. COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4. 
 38. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 4, at 32. 
 39. See, e.g., Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations 
at Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 236 (2011) (reporting that 
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Despite this consensus about independent agencies’ analytical 
deficiencies, it is actually more difficult than it may seem to assess 
exactly how well or poorly independent agencies are doing in 
analyzing their rules.  The mere fact that these agencies report to the 
Comptroller General that some—or even many—of their rulemakings 
do not include quantified or monetized estimates of benefits or costs 
only says so much.40  When researchers have looked in depth at the 
specific materials prepared by independent agencies in individual 
rulemakings, they have sometimes found that agencies have given 
more attention to the benefits or costs of their rules than the 
summaries they share with the Comptroller General might suggest.41  
More importantly, analysts lack a clear benchmark against which to 
measure the quantity and quality of benefit-cost analyses produced by 
any regulator.  For how many rules exactly is it reasonable to expect 
independent agencies to have produced monetized estimates of 
benefits and costs?  The answer almost surely is not “all rules.” 
Quantification and monetization of regulatory impacts are not always 
possible because of a lack of data, fundamental uncertainties, or insuperable 
conceptual challenges with respect to making particular estimates.42  
Estimating the benefits of homeland security regulations, for example, has 
proven more difficult than for other regulations because of the ex ante low 
probability of the underlying problem and the likelihood of strategic, 
adaptive responses by terrorists to any regulatory interventions.43  Taking 
                                               
their “review suggests that the economic analyses prepared by independent regulatory 
commissions do not measure up to those of the executive branch agencies”); see also 
Jerry Ellig & Rosemarie Fike, Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the Quality of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis 43–45 (Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper No. 13-13, July 2013) 
(reporting study results that suggest independent agencies’ economic analysis is of 
lower quality than such analysis conducted by executive agencies). 
 40. See Fraas & Lutter, supra note 39, at 218–19, 221 (noting that the Comptroller 
General does not “analyze or comment on the substance or quality of rulemaking”). 
 41. See id. at 227 (reporting that rules issued by the Federal Reserve contained 
greater attention to regulatory burdens that indicated by summaries); COPELAND, supra 
note 35, at 111 (noting that, despite what studies based on reported summaries suggest, 
“[i]n fact . . . the agencies often at least qualitatively discuss regulatory costs and benefits 
(and often discuss at least some costs in quantitative or even monetary terms)”). 
 42. Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 222 (1996) (acknowledging that “not all 
impacts can be quantified”). 
 43. Tanya Xu, How Should We Measure Terrorism Risk?, REG. REV. (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/08/25/xu-how-should-we-measure-terrorism-
risk (discussing the challenges of applying typical analytic approaches to intentional 
human behavior like terrorism). 
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account of challenges like these, Executive Order 12,866 expressly 
“recogniz[es] that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify.”44 
Trying to assess the general quality of independent agencies’ 
prospective analyses by comparing their level of quantification or 
monetization with analyses that executive agencies produce will be at 
best suggestive.  What constitutes quality analysis, after all, will be 
specific to each individual problem that a new rule addresses, taking 
into consideration the availability of relevant data.  Some scholars have 
argued that it is much more difficult to quantify the effects of financial 
regulation, a domain dominated by independent regulators.45  In 
addition, research indicates that agencies produce less thorough 
analysis for rules that must be completed under tight statutory 
deadlines,46 and we know that many of the rules that independent 
financial regulators have issued in recent years under the Dodd-Frank 
Act have faced such deadlines.47  Without controlling for factors such 
as these, comparisons of independent agencies’ analyses with those of 
other agencies will be incomplete and even potentially misleading. 
Still, it seems reasonable to assume that independent agencies—
presumably like most agencies—could do a better job of analyzing the 
benefits and costs of their new regulations.48  As Ryan Bubb has 
suggested, it may be that benefit-cost analysis “plays little role in 
financial regulation not because it is especially challenging but rather 
because institutional structures do not produce incentives for financial 
regulators to develop and employ” such analysis.49  If this is correct, 
                                               
 44. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012). 
 45. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 886–87, 997–99 (2014) (arguing against the reliability 
and feasibility of quantitative benefit-cost analysis of financial regulations); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Regulation in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S351–S353 (2014) (arguing that benefit-cost analysis cannot be effectively 
applied to financial regulation).  Other scholars have contested the view that benefit-
cost analysis of financial regulation is infeasible.  See, e.g., Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV.:  PAPERS & PROC. 393–94, 397 
(2013); Revesz, supra note 5, at 548–49. 
 46. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis?  Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181 (2011). 
 47. COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4, 101–02, 111–12. 
 48. See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost 
Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 194–97 (2007) (examining seventy-four regulatory 
impact analyses across three administrations and finding substantial quality shortfalls). 
 49. Ryan Bubb, Comment:  The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial 
Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2015). 
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then we should consider what steps Congress could take to change 
those institutional structures so that independent agencies would have 
more of an incentive to improve their prospective regulatory analysis.  
Three main options can be considered.50 
A. Make No Legislative Changes 
Due to the demands that courts have started to impose on 
independent regulatory agencies,51 as well as the generally heightened 
salience of the issue of regulatory analysis at independent agencies 
(including the prospect of legislative change), independent regulators 
appear already to be taking some steps to improve their institutional 
capacity for producing quality analysis.52  The SEC, for example, has 
made notable strides in strengthening its economic staff in the wake of 
the Business Roundtable v. SEC53 decision.54  The FCC has released plans 
to create an Office of Economics and Analytics intended to “expand 
and deepen the use of economic analysis” at the Commission.55 
                                               
 50. The options discussed below all contemplate general changes to administrative 
procedures.  It bears noting that, if Congress wished to take a more incremental 
approach, it could target just one or more individual agencies.  To some extent, the 
organic statutes of individual agencies already vary in that they direct some agencies to 
consider—and others not to consider—costs when making regulatory decisions.  See 
COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4. 
 51. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 290 (2013) (describing how the D.C. Circuit “has set a very high bar 
for economic analysis in rulemaking” for the SEC and other financial regulators through a 
string of cases spanning twenty years); Eugene Scalia, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Reasoned Agency 
Decision-Making, REG. REV. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/26/ 
scalia-cost-benefit-analysis-reasoned-agency-decision-making (defending court actions over 
the SEC’s mutual fund governance rule and its proxy access rule). 
 52. Kraus & Raso, supra note 51, at 327–29, 342. 
 53. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 54. Kraus & Raso, supra note 51, at 292, 325–26 (explaining that “[t]he SEC began 
implementing significant changes only in the wake of the Business Roundtable decision.  
The artificial separation of the SEC [benefit-cost analysis] and [efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation] consideration sections was finally abandoned,” 
resulting in the publication of one analysis for each issue the SEC addressed, which 
laid out the fact with the benefits and drawback of each proposed rule); see also Jerry 
Ellig, Systematic Study Shows Improvement in SEC Economic Analysis, REG. REV. (Mar. 20, 
2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/03/20/ellig-systematic-study-shows-
improvement-sec-economic-analysis. 
 55. Fact Sheet:  Establishment of the Office of Economics and Analytics Order, FED. 
COMMC’N COMM’N (Jan. 9, 2018), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/ 
Daily_Business/2018/db0109/DOC-348636A1.pdf; see also Ajit Pai, The Importance of 
Economic Analysis at the FCC (April 5, 2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
media.hudson.org/files/publications/20170405PaiDOC-344248A1.pdf (remarks of 
FCC Chairman Ajit Pai at the Hudson Institute). 
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The first option for Congress, then, would be simply to wait before 
doing anything further, as the quality of prospective analysis at 
independent agencies seems likely to improve, at least to some degree, 
on its own over time.  Of course, not all independent agencies will 
make the same strides.  Another disadvantage of waiting is that, in the 
intervening time, independent agencies will continue to make 
regulatory decisions that could have important consequences for 
economic activity and could be in place for a long time. 
B. Codify the Requirements of Executive Order 12,866  
for Independent Agencies 
Scholars have long considered the question of whether Presidents 
may legally apply the requirements in Executive Order 12,866 to 
independent agencies, and Presidents themselves have been reluctant 
to do so for the past thirty years.56  By contrast, Congress would not face 
any such legal question if it were to codify the requirements of 
Executive Order 12,866 and apply them to independent agencies. 
This option would have the advantage of creating symmetry in the 
analytical requirements for regulation by both executive agencies and 
independent agencies.  After all, regulations affect the public and the 
economy regardless of whether executive or independent agencies issue 
them.  Legislatively imposing those requirements on independent 
agencies would cure an anomaly in the law, providing independent 
agencies with the same institutional structures and incentives for 
producing quality prospective analysis as executive agencies. 
Although subjecting independent agencies to the same 
requirements for producing regulatory analysis as executive agencies 
could be easily justified on the grounds of sound regulatory 
management, applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866 to 
independent agencies would make a significant alteration in the policy 
autonomy that has long been afforded to independent agencies.  
Executive Order 12,866 does not merely call for agencies to conduct 
prospective analysis; it also creates an institutional review process that 
gives the OIRA Administrator, and ultimately the President, oversight 
                                               
 56. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of 
Powers:  The Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235, 1258–
59 (1981) (“More difficult questions would surely be posed if the President were to 
extend all the provisions of [the regulatory review] Executive Order . . . to 
[independent] agencies, the heads of which are not removable at his discretion.”); 
Revesz, supra note 5, at 586 (observing that no President has extended regulatory 
review to independent agencies due to concerns about congressional reactions). 
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and gate-keeping influence over agencies’ regulatory decisions.57  As 
Executive Order 12,866 expressly states in numerous places, the 
regulatory review process is one that aims at ensuring regulation will 
be consistent with the “President’s priorities.”58  In addition, under 
section 6(a)(3)(A) of the Executive Order, the OIRA Administrator 
can ultimately determine which rules it will deem significant and thus 
subject to regulatory analysis and review.59  In addition, section 8 of the 
Executive Order precludes an agency from publishing a rule while it is 
still under review at OIRA, and section 7 establishes a process through 
which conflicts between OIRA and the agency head can be elevated to 
the President for resolution.60 
Legislatively applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866 to 
independent agencies would not only compel such agencies to adhere 
to the Order’s principles for sound regulatory analysis—a laudable 
objective—but it would also apply to such agencies the Executive 
Order’s institutional and process provisions, several of which would 
prove incompatible with the structure of most independent agencies.  
The wholesale codification of Executive Order 12,866 would thus 
present three concerns. 
First, the wholesale application of Executive Order 12,866 to 
independent agencies headed by multimember bodies would be 
problematic because the procedures in Executive Order 12,866 are 
drafted to apply to “the agency head.”61  Although it is conceivable that 
the phrase “the agency head” could apply to an entire multimember 
body that constitutes the head of an independent agency,62 the 
Executive Order’s procedures are most naturally intended for agencies 
headed by a single administrator.  A multimember body simply could 
not engage in the kind of back-and-forth interactions contemplated by 
Executive Order 12,866.63  The practice of regulatory review under the 
Order routinely involves a working interchange and dialogue between 
                                               
 57. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted as amended 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012). 
 58. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 2(a), 2(b), 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. 640, 642. 
 59. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. 645. 
 60. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 7–8, 3 C.F.R. 648–49. 
 61. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(C), 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 647; see also 
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 648 (describing the conflict resolution process as 
taking place between the President or Vice President and “the relevant agency head” 
or “the head of the issuing agency”). 
 62. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512–
13 (2010) (“As a constitutional matter, we see no reason why a multimember body may 
not be the ‘Hea[d]’ of a ‘Departmen[t]’ that it governs.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 4(c)(4), 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 643, 647. 
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an agency head (or designee) and the OIRA Administrator (or 
designee),64 a process which as a practical matter would not work well 
with multimember bodies.  If the entire multimember body were taken 
to constitute the agency “head,” then the review process would become 
extremely cumbersome.  Merely determining an agency’s position on 
OIRA’s feedback on the agency’s regulatory impact analysis would 
presumably necessitate a meeting with all commission members in 
accordance with various Government in the Sunshine Act 
requirements65—including open meetings.66 
Second, legislatively applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866 
to independent agencies would signal a major shift in the norms and 
practices of autonomous regulatory decision making that have long 
prevailed at independent agencies.  The Order makes clear that any 
conflicting viewpoints between OIRA and an agency about whether or 
how to proceed with a rule “shall be resolved by the President.”67  To 
the extent that operational autonomy for such agencies remains 
valued, Congress should not apply wholesale to independent agencies 
the institutional mechanisms in Executive Order 12,866.  One alternative 
approach could be to follow the model of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, which does subject independent agencies to some OIRA oversight 
of their information collection efforts but which also expressly allows 
independent agencies to override OIRA’s decisions.68  Another 
alternative can be found in the proposed Independent Agency Regulatory 
                                               
 64. DONALD R. ARBUCKLE, OIRA AND PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW:  A VIEW 
FROM INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 68–70 (2008), https://works.bepress.com/ 
donald_arbuckle/1/download (describing back-and-forth interactions between OIRA 
and agency officials); Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty:  Reflections and Recommendations, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105–07 (2011) (describing the normally collegial working 
relationships between OIRA and agencies). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (outlining the basic requirements for meetings of 
multi-member bodies). 
 66. It is highly doubtful that White House officials would want to conduct their 
meetings with multimember commissions in the open. 
 67. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 648.  Of course, the same provision qualifies 
the priority for the President by indicating that such a priority applies only “[t]o the extent 
permitted by law.”  Id.  Furthermore, section 9 of the Order makes clear that “[n]othing 
in this order shall be construed as displacing agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as 
authorized by law.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 649.  These qualifying provisions 
could naturally be read to preclude the President from having the final say in any disputes 
between OIRA and an independent agency because doing so would offend the agency’s 
legal autonomy.  If so, then this offers another reason not to codify unthinkingly Executive 
Order 12,866 verbatim, for doing so would likely mean that the OIRA review process 
would not have the same impact as it has for executive agencies. 
 68. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f) (2012). 
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Analysis Act, introduced by Senator Rob Portman (R-OH).69  This bill 
would authorize the President to extend the analysis requirements of 
Executive Order 12,866 to independent agencies and to require them 
to submit their analyses to OIRA for review; however, the agency would 
not be bound, either by the statute or any executive order pursuant to 
it, to respond to any feedback from OIRA.70  The agency’s analysis and 
OIRA’s feedback would, however, become part of the administrative 
record on judicial review, thus effectively requiring the agency to give a 
reason for any departure from what OIRA recommends.71 
Finally, even with changes to Executive Order 12,866 along the lines 
of those in Senator Portman’s bill, the process of having the White 
House review actions by independent agencies would still result in some 
palpable shift in longstanding norms of agency independence.  Congress 
would do well to consider the practical implications that would follow 
from assigning or authorizing White House review of independent 
agencies’ regulatory analyses.  In particular, such a shift would present 
obvious institutional challenges for OIRA, which possesses a very tiny 
staff compared with the many executive agencies it oversees.72  
Legislation that would thrust responsibility on OIRA for overseeing the 
actions of as many as twenty additional regulatory agencies would 
necessitate a substantial increase in OIRA personnel and funding. 
C. Eliminate UMRA’s Exemption for Independent Agencies 
A third option for Congress to consider would be to remove the 
independent agency exemption contained in UMRA.73  This option 
would address the current statutory asymmetry in independent agencies’ 
analytical requirements vis-à-vis executive agencies, while avoiding any 
questions or concerns about the White House intruding on independent 
agencies’ policy autonomy.  It would also obviate any need to increase 
the funding and size of OIRA, as compliance with UMRA’s benefit-cost 
                                               
 69. S. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 70. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 71. See id. § 4. 
 72. Robin Bravender & Emily Yehle, Wonks in Embattled Regulatory Office are 
Mysterious—But “Not Nefarious,” E&E NEWS (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.eenews.net/ 
stories/1059994711 (“OIRA has a staff of about 44 people.”). 
 73. 2 U.S.C. § 1502(1) (2012) (incorporating the definition of “agency” in 2 U.S.C. 
§ 658, which “does not include independent regulatory agencies”).  At least three bills 
have been introduced in Congress that would eliminate this exemption from UMRA: 
(1) Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2017, S. 686, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017); 
(2) Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 1523, 115th 
Cong. § 5 (2017); and (3) Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 
2017, H.R. 50, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017). 
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analysis requirement does not involve OIRA.74  UMRA simply imposes 
a legal obligation on agencies to produce a statement of benefits and 
costs of rules covered by the Act.  This obligation to produce such a 
statement is judicially enforceable, but the Act precludes courts from 
ruling on the adequacy of agencies’ analyses.75 
One small potential downside of this approach might be that 
UMRA’s analytic requirements do not apply to as many rules as 
Executive Order 12,866.  UMRA’s threshold applies to rules that 
impose $100 million or more in annual “costs,”76 rather than rules having 
similar levels of what the Executive Order describes as economic “effects,” 
a term which presumably encompasses both costs and benefits.77  Plus, 
the $100 million amount in UMRA adjusts over time for inflation, so 
today the threshold is much higher.78  Still, if UMRA’s somewhat more 
limited scope were a concern, Congress could simply adjust the 
threshold to make it comparable to the one in Executive Order 12,866. 
The larger question about eliminating UMRA’s exemption for 
independent agencies would be whether it would provide enough of 
an institutional incentive for agencies to produce better quality 
analysis.  Although eliminating the UMRA exemption would not 
provide for any institutional peer review role of the kind that OIRA 
provides for executive agencies, UMRA does ensure that agencies are 
required, under the threat of a potential court order, to prepare 
benefit-cost analyses.  Moreover, the analyses they prepare to comply 
with UMRA can form part of the agency record and thus are reviewable 
by courts under the general arbitrary and capricious standard in the 
                                               
 74. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2). 
 75. §§ 1532(a)(2), 1571(a)(2)–(3).  Under section 1571(a)(2) of the UMRA, if an 
agency fails to complete a required “statement” of benefits and costs for a qualifying 
rule, “a court may compel the agency to prepare such written statement.”  Id. 
§ 1571(a)(2)(B).  Section 1571(a)(3) states that “the inadequacy or failure to prepare 
such statement . . . shall not be used as a basis for staying, enjoining, invalidating or 
otherwise affecting such agency rule.”  Id. § 1571(a)(3).  In other words, UMRA 
authorizes the courts to compel the preparation of a benefit-cost analysis, but courts 
cannot, on the basis of UMRA, remand a rule because the agency failed to prepare 
such an analysis or because a court finds the agency’s analysis to be inadequate.  
Id. § 1571(a)(2), (3). 
 76. § 1532(a) (requiring economic impact statement for rules that would demand 
an “expenditure . . . by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more”). 
 77. The Executive Order defines a “significant regulatory action” as one that is 
expected to “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”  
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 78. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a). 
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Administrative Procedure Act.79  For this reason, if the UMRA 
exemption were removed, independent agencies would clearly have an 
added institutional incentive to conduct benefit-cost analysis and to 
take its findings seriously.  A further advantage of removing the UMRA 
exemption would be that independent agencies could no longer claim, 
as they now do, that benefit-cost analysis is simply not required of them, 
which could help in shifting organizational norms within these 
agencies in a positive direction that promotes the value of producing 
quality prospective regulatory analysis. 
This third option—removing UMRA’s exemption—would offer a 
middle ground between doing nothing and involving OIRA in 
overseeing independent agencies’ regulatory development.  Removing 
the UMRA exemption would not disrupt existing norms of 
independence nor would it demand the development of significant 
new review capacity at OIRA.  It would nevertheless advance the 
objective of achieving legal parity between independent agencies and 
executive agencies with respect to regulatory analysis.  Pursuing a 
middle ground, rather than going to the extreme of involving OIRA in 
the work of independent agencies, would seem especially prudent in 
light of the limitations in current assessments of the adequacy of 
regulatory analysis at independent agencies.80  Moreover, it is 
important to keep in mind that OIRA review has not cured all 
inadequacies in regulatory analysis at executive agencies.81 
In contemplating whether to take action, members of Congress 
should focus on what steps will best promote improvements in 
prospective analysis and regulatory decision making, taking into 
account the values that Congress has long recognized in institutional 
autonomy for regulators in certain policy domains, such as financial 
regulation.  In addition to giving overall consideration to the values 
served by both analysis and autonomy, members of Congress should also 
                                               
 79. Section 1571(a)(4) of UMRA provides that “[a]ny information generated [in 
developing a benefit-cost analysis statement] that is part of the rulemaking record for 
judicial review under the provisions of any other Federal law may be considered as part 
of the record for judicial review conducted under such other provisions of Federal law.”  Id. 
§ 1571(a)(4).  Thus, although courts cannot pass on the adequacy of an agency’s 
“statement” under UMRA, they can review the underlying “information” upon which 
the statement is based when reviewing agency rules under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2012), the arbitrary and capricious standard in the Administrative Procedure Act. 
 80. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 81. Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1119–25 (reviewing the 
available empirical research on the impact of the economic analysis required under 
executive order and concluding that such a requirement “does not eliminate 
inefficiency, and it may not even significantly reduce it”); see also infra note 85. 
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keep in mind several other considerations when deliberating about how 
to improve regulatory impact analysis at independent agencies:   
 Continue to recognize the practical limits associated with conducting 
benefit-cost analysis.  Currently, Executive Order 12,866 and 
UMRA recognize that full quantification and monetization of 
benefits and costs will not always be feasible for all 
regulations.82  Any further legislative action should similarly 
recognize these feasibility concerns and continue to allow 
agencies the discretion to adopt appropriate regulations even 
if some impacts cannot be quantified or monetized. 
 Take into account specific legislative mandates applicable to 
individual agencies.  Some agencies’ organic statutes 
preclude them from considering costs when making 
certain regulatory decisions.83  Congress should approach 
any new legislation imposing general analytic requirements 
mindful of the implications such action might have for 
these individual statutory requirements. 
 Recognize that conducting quality analysis demands resources.  As 
Shelley Metzenbaum and Gaurav Vasisht have written, 
“Funding adequacy has a direct and profound impact on 
whether a regulator can be effective.”84  If Congress takes steps 
to mandate that independent agencies undertake additional 
analysis, it should also ensure that these agencies have the 
resources needed to fulfill any such mandate effectively. 
 Do not expect perfection.  Even with mandates, regulatory 
analysis will not always be completed well nor will it always 
influence regulatory decisions to the extent that it should.  
Despite decades of experience with OIRA’s oversight of 
executive agencies, there remains substantial variation in 
                                               
 82. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (requiring agencies to estimate compliance costs only 
“to the extent that the agency determines that accurate estimates are reasonably 
feasible”); Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 1(b)(6), 6(a)(3)(C)(i)–(ii), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639, 
645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (specifically 
“recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify” and requiring 
quantification of benefits and costs only to the “extent feasible”). 
 83. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding 
that the Clean Air Act does not permit the EPA to consider costs when setting ambient 
air quality standards).  See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency 
Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 71 (“[A]n agency cannot 
consider a factor that Congress explicitly or implicitly prohibited it from considering.”). 
 84. Shelley H. Metzenbaum & Gaurav Vasisht, What Makes a Regulator Excellent?  
Mission, Funding, Information, and Judgment, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 148, 
153 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017). 
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these agencies’ compliance with best practices of economic 
analysis of regulations.85  What I wrote over a dozen years 
ago remains true today:  “The available empirical research 
indicates that simply mandating analysis does not eliminate 
inefficiency, and it may not even significantly reduce it.”86 
The Administrative Conference has reinforced these considerations 
in recommending to Congress, should it impose new requirements on 
independent agencies, that it “recognize that agencies need (a) the 
flexibility to scale the analyses to the significance of the rules and 
(b) the resources to satisfy such requirements.”87  Any effort to eliminate 
independent agencies’ exemptions from requirements to conduct 
regulatory analysis should be approached with thoughtful attention to 
the conditions and capacities that agencies will need to ensure that they 
can prepare sound analysis and take its results seriously. 
II. RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
The Obama Administration took a number of steps to build what it 
characterized as a “culture of retrospective review and analysis 
throughout the executive branch.”88  In early 2011, President Barack 
Obama issued Executive Order 13,563, proclaiming that the nation’s 
regulatory system “must measure, and seek to improve, the actual 
results of regulatory requirements.”89  That order directed executive 
agencies to develop plans for “periodic[] review [of] existing 
significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations 
should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make 
the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome.”90 
In response, over about five years’ time, executive agencies 
reportedly undertook more than 800 retrospective reviews and 
                                               
 85. Hahn & Dudley, supra note 48, at 206–07 (finding that the quality of agencies’ 
regulatory analyses varied greatly across agencies and from one administration to the next). 
 86. Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1125. 
 87. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 2013-3:  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AT INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 8 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recomme
ndation%202013-2%20%28Benefit-Cost%20Analysis%29_0.pdf. 
 88. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office 
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (April 25, 2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/
m11-19.pdf. 
 89. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17 (2012). 
 90. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 217. 
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eliminated over seventy “regulatory provisions.”91  According to then-
OIRA Administrator Howard Shelanski, these efforts “achieved an 
estimated $37 billion in cost savings, reduced paperwork, and other 
benefits for Americans.”92  His examples of such cost-savings all 
stemmed from regulatory changes at executive agencies,93 including 
the now-famous EPA “spilled milk” regulation which effectively 
exempted certain milk storage containers from particular EPA oil spill 
                                               
 91. Howard Shelanski, Retrospective Review, by the Numbers, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Aug. 31, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/08/ 
31/retrospective-review-numbers-0. 
 92. Id.  A review of the Obama Administration’s lookback initiative that the 
Administrative Conference commissioned suggests that many of these cost-savings 
came in the form of administrative changes, such as switching to electronic filings, 
rather than making substantive regulatory changes.  JOSEPH E. ALDY, LEARNING FROM 
EXPERIENCE:  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND THE 
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY POLICY 52 
(2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%2520
Review%2520Draft%252011-17-2014.pdf.  A random sample of fifty retrospective reviews, 
completed in July 2015 for a separate project at the Penn Program on Regulation, showed 
that, in slightly more than three-fourths of the reviews that resulted in changes, the changes 
were of an administrative or paperwork variety.  Reducing unnecessary paperwork burdens 
is no doubt to be applauded, but streamlining administrative processes is not squarely 
centered on improving “the actual results of regulatory requirements.”  Executive Order 
13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215. 
 93. See, e.g., Howard Shelanski, Reducing Costs and Burdens:  Further Progress in Regulatory 
Lookback Effort, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 7, 2014, 7:05 PM), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/blog/2014/05/07/reducing-costs-and-burdens-further-progress-
regulatory-lookback-effort (highlighting the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
change to a regulation, which was projected to save $3 billion over five years); Howard 
Shelanski, Regulatory Lookback Eliminates Major Paperwork Burden, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Aug. 8, 2013, 12:42 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/08/08/ 
regulatory-lookback-eliminates-major-paperwork-burden (discussing retrospective 
review at the Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Transportation (DOT), and 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)); Shelanski, supra note 91 
(discussing retrospective review of regulatory systems at DOL, DOT, and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)); Howard Shelanski, Retrospective Review:  July 
2015 Lookback Reports, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2015, 11:30 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/08/14/retrospective-review-july-
2015-lookback-reports-0 (reviewing the efforts to reduce regulatory compliance at the 
Attorney General’s office, Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Interior, Department of Justice, DOL, DOT, EPA, and the 
Small Business Administration); see also Cass Sunstein, Smarter Regulation:  Reducing 
Cumulative Burdens, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/03/20/smarter-regulation-reducing -
cumulative-burdens (explaining that a DOL regulation adjustment will save employers 
$2.5 billion).  For additional discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER:  THE FUTURE 
OF GOVERNMENT (2013).  Sunstein worked on regulatory reform initiatives as the first 
OIRA Administrator in the Obama Administration.  Id. 
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rules.94  But what have independent regulatory agencies accomplished in 
terms of retrospective analysis of their stock of regulations? 
In July 2011, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13,579, 
stating that “each independent regulatory agency should develop and 
release to the public a plan” for retrospective review of its existing 
significant regulations.95  Eleven days later, the OIRA Administrator at 
the time, Cass Sunstein, sent the heads of independent agencies a 
memorandum in which he offered expressly non-binding “guidance” 
on the President’s order, noting that independent “[a]gencies may 
well find it useful to engage in a retrospective analysis of the costs and 
benefits . . . of regulations chosen for review.”96  He emphasized that 
“[s]uch analyses can inform judgments about whether to modify, 
expand, streamline, or repeal such regulations, and can also provide 
valuable insight on the strengths and weaknesses of pre-regulatory 
assessments [that is, prospective analysis] which can be used to enhance 
the agency’s analytic capability.”97 
The White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) reported 
that, as of November 2011, a total of twenty-one independent agencies 
had developed retrospective review plans as called for by the Executive 
Order.98  This included all the major regulatory agencies designated as 
independent under the Paperwork Reduction Act.99  The CEA report 
indicated that the independent agencies’ plans reflected “substantial 
efforts to reduce burdens” and it highlighted review efforts taken or 
underway at seven independent agencies (CFTC, FCC, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
Federal Reserve, Federal Trade Commission, and OCC).100  Although 
the CEA report described most of the efforts at these seven agencies as 
still at an early stage, the report indicated that at least the FCC had 
                                               
 94. Cary Coglianese, Taking Regulation Seriously, REG. REV. (Jan. 28, 2012), 
http://www.theregreview.org/2012/01/28/taking-regulation-seriously. 
 95. Exec. Order 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
app. at 817–18 (2012). 
 96. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office 
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (July 22, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m
11-28.pdf [hereinafter Sunstein, Memorandum on Executive Order 13,579]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, SMARTER REGULATIONS 
THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 10 (2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/lookback_report_rev_final.pdf [hereinafter SMARTER REGULATIONS 
THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW]. 
 99. Id. at 10–11. 
 100. Id. 
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already “eliminated 190 rules, many of which are no longer needed as 
a result of technological advances.”101 
The rigor and depth of agencies’ analytic efforts in these 
retrospective reviews, whether conducted by executive or independent 
agencies, proved generally quite limited.  According to a report that 
the Administrative Conference commissioned, the “vast majority” of 
executive agencies’ efforts lacked “formal retrospective analysis, such 
as ex post estimates of benefits, costs, or efficacy.”102  What we know 
about the independent agencies’ efforts makes them look still less 
substantial.  Most of the plans submitted by independent agencies 
basically described existing, routine practices of consultation with the 
public and intentions to keep abreast of developments in the regulated 
industry.103  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for example, 
took nearly two and a half years to take its initial retrospective review 
plan submitted to the White House and approve it as a final plan—but 
even then that final “plan” consisted only of a compilation of existing 
principles and practices that guide NRC rulemaking activities.104  The 
CPSC took nearly five years before it approved a brief document that 
did little more than describe an internal process to follow, and 
questions for agency staff to consider, in selecting existing rules to 
review.105  Much as with the executive agencies, few, if any, of the 
independent agency plans could be said to contain or call for truly 
robust “formal retrospective analysis.”106 
                                               
 101. Id. at 4, 10.  Undoubtedly this sounds like a major achievement in regulatory 
reduction, but it is hard to imagine that the FCC’s actions could be attributable to any 
serious retrospective review conducted in just the four months following the signing of 
Executive Order 13,579.  The timing of the FCC’s actions suggests that either these 
revocations were already in progress before that order was issued or that the rules that were 
eliminated were so obviously outmoded that removing them was an inconsequential 
housekeeping matter. 
 102. ALDY, supra note 92, at 52. 
 103. Id. at 49–50 (explaining that, of thirty-nine independent agency rules issued in 
2013 and 2014, “only eight monetized the costs of the regulatory action,” “none . . . 
monetized the benefits,” and the regulations did not result from retrospective review 
nor contain provisions for future review). 
 104. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
EXISTING RULES 5 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1400/ML14002A441.pdf. 
 105. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, RCA:  PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF 
EXISTING RULES 6–7 (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/PlanforRetrospective 
ReviewExistingRules.pdf. 
 106. Overall, a Senate Committee found in 2015 that agency retrospective review 
“efforts had resulted in few completed reviews since the 2011 executive orders and that 
better data and more planning would allow agencies to conduct better reviews.”  
S. REP. NO. 114-282, at 4 (2016). 
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It is far from clear whether independent agencies have made much 
more progress over time in improving their retrospective analyses.  For 
the duration of the Obama Administration, anyone interested in executive 
agencies’ progress could go to the White House website and find status 
reports submitted twice each year.107  But no such repository ever existed 
of the status or accomplishments at independent agencies.  Indeed, it is 
not even clear how many of these agencies ever followed through at all 
on the initial plans they submitted.  Executive Order 13,563—the one 
that Executive Order 13,579 directed at independent agencies—only 
called for agencies to produce an initial plan.108  Regular progress reports 
on retrospective review were called for in a subsequent memorandum 
from the OIRA Administrator109 as well as a subsequent presidential 
order,110 both of which were directed just to executive agencies. 
The Obama Administration’s regulatory lookback initiative aimed, 
laudably, to build a culture of retrospective review through the 
“continuing process of scrutiny of existing rules” fostered by the 
presidential requirement of regular progress reports.111  It remains to 
be seen, of course, to what extent the Administration’s lookback 
initiative has contributed to any enduring cultural shift at any agency.  
Although the Trump Administration has not made retrospective 
analysis a centerpiece of its regulatory agenda, some commentators 
have suggested that Executive Order 13,771—which calls for executive 
agencies to eliminate existing regulations to offset the costs of new 
regulations112—may provide additional incentives for agencies to 
evaluate existing regulations.113  Of course, whatever positive, lasting 
                                               
 107. See, e.g., Retrospective Review of Regulations, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing twenty-six 
government entities and their status reports for 2015 and 2016). 
 108. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 816–17 (2012). 
 109. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office 
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/impl
ementation-of-retrospective-review-plans.pdf [hereinafter Sunstein, Memorandum on 
Implementation of Retrospective Review Plans]. 
 110. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 820–21 (2012). 
 111. Sunstein, Memorandum on Implementation of Retrospective Review Plans, 
supra note 109. 
 112. Executive Order 13,771 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (2017). 
 113. See, e.g., Sofie E. Miller & Susan E. Dudley, The Devil is in the Details of President 
Trump’s Regulatory Executive Order, REGULATORY STUD. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/devil-details-president-trump%E2% 
80%99s-regulatory-executive-order (“Although many [P]residents have encouraged 
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change either the Obama lookback initiative or the Trump “one-in-
two-out” requirement may have in terms of promoting retrospective 
review at executive agencies, presumably any such impact has been still 
more attenuated at independent agencies. 
Clearly, more can be done to foster a governmental culture that 
embraces serious retrospective analysis of regulations at both executive 
and independent agencies.  One desirable cultural shift would entail 
refocusing and broadening the rationale for retrospective review.  As 
economist Joseph Aldy aptly notes in his report to the Administrative 
Conference, burden reduction was a common theme of the Obama 
Administration’s lookback initiative, as well as of similar efforts in earlier 
administrations.114  The Trump Administration’s regulatory agenda 
appears exclusively focused on burden reduction.115  Yet instead of just 
focusing on reducing regulatory costs or burdens, retrospective review 
should also consider regulatory benefits in an effort to help agencies 
overall create better-designed and better-implemented regulations.116  
Smarter regulation means not only creating more cost-effective 
outcomes but also delivering greater overall benefits. 
Retrospective review can provide valuable information that can be used 
to inform future regulatory decisions.117  Multiple regulatory agencies, 
executive and independent, face similar challenges, such as in regulating 
to promote private investment in anti-terrorism security efforts to protect 
key infrastructure, or in regulating to foster a “safety culture” within high-
hazard industrial operations.118  Retrospective evaluation research can 
                                               
agencies to retrospectively review their regulations, President Trump’s [executive 
order] may provide agencies with some of the strongest incentives for assessing the 
costs—and the benefits—of their existing rules.”). 
 114. ALDY, supra note 92, at 34. 
 115. Unlike other executive orders on regulation, President Donald J. Trump’s 
Executive Order 13,771 makes no mention of even the possibility of any benefits from 
regulation, emphasizing instead just a need “to manage the costs associated with the 
governmental imposition of private expenditures required to comply with Federal 
regulations.”  Exec. Order 13,771 § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339. 
 116. Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 11, at 250–51. 
 117. Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Excellence, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY 
EXCELLENCE 299–300, 305–06 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017) (explaining why 
measurement is essential for regulators to learn what works and to make smarter 
decisions); see also Admin. Conf. Recommendation 2017-6, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,738–42 
(Dec. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Learning from Regulatory 
Experience] (emphasizing the importance of learning from experience in order to 
make better regulatory decisions). 
 118. Reviewing Independent Agency Rulemaking:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th 
Cong. 79 (2016) (statement of Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, 
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fruitfully illuminate such common challenges among regulators working 
in related areas.119  Learning how different types of regulatory strategies—
such as market-based instruments, management-based regulation, 
behavioral nudges, or performance standards—have performed in one 
regulatory domain can be useful in designing regulations in other 
similar domains.120  Furthermore, by comparing the results of rigorous 
retrospective evaluations of individual rules’ costs and benefits with the 
prospective estimates that agencies make of these costs and benefits, 
agencies and their analysts can learn how to improve the regulatory 
analysis that takes place when agencies develop new rules.121 
What concrete steps might Congress take to help independent agencies 
better realize retrospective review’s full potential for deepening regulatory 
knowledge and improving regulatory decision making?  Three possibilities 
merit consideration with respect to both executive and independent agencies. 
A. Codify and Extend Requirements for Regular Reporting  
on Strategically Focused Retrospective Reviews 
The practices that emerged within executive agencies over the final 
five years of the Obama Administration under Executive Orders 13,563 
and 13,610 provide a foundation on which agencies could be 
encouraged to build.  To ensure continuation of these practices, 
Congress could productively codify similar planning and progress 
reporting requirements—and extend them to independent regulatory 
agencies—helping to ensure that regular, strategic efforts of regulatory 
evaluation remain implemented. 
If Congress were to take such action, retrospective review practices 
could benefit from a broadening of their purpose beyond the 
worthwhile objectives of streamlining and burden reduction, which 
have almost exclusively characterized retrospective review efforts in the 
                                               
Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania); see TRANSP. 
RESEARCH BD., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS 
FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES (2017), http://nap.edu/24907 (examining several 
industries that pose high safety risks and offering recommendations for regulating 
those sectors); Cary Coglianese & Thomas R. Menzies, Designing Safety Regulations for 
High-Hazard Industries, REG. REV. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/ 
2017/10/04/coglianese-menzies-safety-regulations-hazard-industries (summarizing 
and commenting on the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s 
report on regulatory design). 
 119. Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 
ONLINE 57, 65 (2013), http://yalejreg.com/moving-forward-with-regulatory-lookback. 
 120. For a helpful discussion of differences in regulatory strategies, see Coglianese 
& Menzies, supra note 118. 
 121. Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 11, at 251–52. 
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past.122  In the Regulatory Flexibility Act, for example, Congress has 
already required both executive and independent agencies to 
undertake mandatory periodic reviews (at least every ten years) of all 
rules imposing “significant economic impact[s]” on small businesses.123  
The statute’s stated purpose for such reviews is narrow:  “to minimize 
any significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial 
number of such small entities.”124  Instead of limiting the focus of 
retrospective review so narrowly, Congress could amend the statute to 
encourage retrospective analysis that promotes smarter, more strategic 
regulatory decisions—that is, analysis that measures and potentially 
increases benefits, in addition to finding cost reductions.  In other 
words, Congress could direct agencies to design evaluations under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act that would support the goal, as stated in 
Executive Order 12,866, of developing a better system of regulation 
“that protects and improves . . . health, safety, environment, and well-
being and improves the performance of the economy without 
imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society.”125 
Agency officials currently have considerable discretion over which 
rules to target for retrospective analysis and how to conduct that 
analysis.126  Presumably any legislation codifying Executive Order 13,563 
would continue to allow agencies to have the discretion and responsibility 
to determine which rules to review, along with when and how to review 
them, as these decisions will depend on each agency’s overall priorities 
and available resources.127  Legislation, though, can help shape these 
priorities in a direction that promotes public value through genuine 
learning.  For example, agencies might appropriately be encouraged to 
analyze rules that they issued under conditions of high uncertainty 
                                               
 122. See ALDY, supra note 92, at 34 (recognizing that past reviews have sought to 
streamline rules and reduce burdens). 
 123. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2012). 
 124. Id.  Executive Order 13,563 contains a similar purpose:  “to promote 
retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome.”  Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), 
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17. 
 125. Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
app. at 802–06. 
 126. See Sunstein, Memorandum on Executive Order 13,579, supra note 96 (urging 
agencies to “exercise [their] discretion to develop a plan tailored to [their] specific 
mission, resources, organizational structure, and rulemaking history and volume”). 
 127. If Congress seeks to direct an agency to evaluate a specific regulation or set of 
regulations, it always can do so through other legislation, as it already does from time 
to time.  In such cases, Congress may also need to consider appropriating additional 
funding to support the desired evaluation research. 
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about their costs or benefits, or rules that rely on common assumptions 
or present common problems of interest to regulators.128 
Maintaining OIRA’s current role in overseeing agency reporting about 
retrospective review—acting as a government-wide clearinghouse of 
sorts—would make sense for several reasons, even for independent 
agencies.  First, it could help ensure that OIRA staff can benefit from 
the knowledge generated from agencies’ retrospective analyses.  Such 
learning would inform OIRA staff members in their efforts to oversee 
executive agencies’ prospective analyses.  OIRA staff would also be well-
positioned to articulate any government-wide best practices or other 
methodological guidelines for retrospective analysis, much as OIRA 
has done for prospective analysis with its Circular A-4.129 
Second, since OIRA coordinates the implementation of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act across the entire federal government,130 
keeping its staff members apprised of independent and executive 
agencies’ data needs may enable them to streamline any information 
requests necessary to evaluate existing rules.  Often the only way to 
conduct meaningful retrospective analysis will be to require reports 
or survey responses from individuals or organizations in the private 
                                               
 128. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 64–65 (recommending that agencies be 
encouraged to evaluate rules promulgated in the light of uncertainty over benefits or 
costs or in the face of common issues presented in multiple rulemakings).  As a report 
issued by the CEA has noted, “Retrospective analysis is an important complement to 
prospective analysis.  In some cases, prospective analysis of costs and benefits will be 
highly uncertain; retrospective analysis can provide valuable additional information 
and ultimately lead to better regulations.”  SMARTER REGULATIONS THROUGH 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW, supra note 98, at 1.  In addition, recommendations issued by 
the Administrative Conference contain a further list of helpful considerations that 
agencies may consider when prioritizing retrospective analysis.  ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2014-5:  RETROSPECTIVE 
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES 9–10 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Recommendation%25202014-5%2520%2528Retrospective%2520Review 
%2529_1.pdf.  Such recommendations could be usefully codified as criteria for agencies 
to draw upon when planning and conducting retrospective analysis. 
 129. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4:  
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 2–3 (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (identifying “three basic 
elements” that every prospective analysis should include).  Of course, independent 
agencies would need to have the good sense to refer to and rely on these best practices 
or guidelines, as absent any changes to existing analytic requirements these agencies 
would not fall within the OIRA orbit.  For a robust argument for making such changes, 
precisely so that independent agencies can benefit from quality guidance from OIRA, 
see Revesz, supra note 5, at 584–86, 588. 
 130. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2012) (establishing OIRA within the Office of 
Management and Budget). 
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sector, the very kind of agency “collection of information” that the 
Paperwork Reduction Act conditions on OIRA approval.131 
Third, OIRA could incorporate overall progress and key findings 
from agencies’ retrospective reviews into its annual reports to Congress 
on the benefits and costs of regulation.  Currently, these reports only 
provide estimated or forecasted benefits and costs of regulation,132 but 
Congress could also benefit from systematic reporting of ex post 
identification of regulatory benefits and costs. 
Finally, OIRA could be encouraged or authorized to issue non-
binding “evaluation prompts” to agencies, identifying specific rules 
that would benefit from careful retrospective study.133  OIRA is 
especially well-positioned to identify either particular rules or general 
regulatory or analytical issues where evaluation findings could help 
improve prospective regulatory impact analysis.  Its role in making 
suggestions to independent agencies about evaluations to undertake 
would not intrude on such agencies’ core policy autonomy.  Such 
prompts could be stipulated by law to be completely non-binding for 
independent agencies—and for executive agencies, for that matter. 
Even if all four suggestions above were implemented, the overall role 
contemplated for OIRA with respect to retrospective analysis would be 
largely one of information aggregation.  OIRA would serve as the 
recipient of reports and the facilitator of learning.  None of these 
suggestions need disrupt prevailing norms of agency independence nor 
require any dramatic changes to OIRA’s resources or staffing levels. 
B. Require Agencies to Issue Evaluation Plans  
when Promulgating New Major Rules 
In principle, a well-developed regulatory impact analysis—the kind 
prepared prospectively to comply with UMRA and Executive Order 
                                               
 131. § 3507 (codifying the requirements for approval of agency collection of 
information from the public).  As previously noted, independent agencies can 
override an OIRA disapproval of an information collection request.  See supra note 68 
and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 5 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_re
ports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf (“As has been the practice 
for many years, all estimates presented in this chapter are agency estimates of benefits 
and costs, or minor modifications of agency information performed by OMB.”). 
 133. See Coglianese, supra note 119, at 64–66 (proposing a practice of “evaluation 
prompts,” according to which OIRA would identify rules that would present valuable 
learning opportunities). 
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12,866—will provide much helpful information that evaluators could 
use to organize an evaluation of a regulation later.  Still, as noted in 
Part I, regulatory impact analyses are not always of uniform quality.134  
Moreover, the exercise of completing even a brief, standardized 
evaluation plan at the time of a rule’s establishment can discipline and 
sharpen a decision maker’s thinking. 
Such required plans need not be onerous.135  At a minimum, they 
simply need to include: (a) a description of concrete criteria, indicators, 
or proxies of regulatory impacts (specific benefits as well as costs); (b) 
known existing data that could be used to measure the rule’s impacts, 
or a statement of the type of new data that would be needed to measure 
the rule’s impacts; (c) an estimated time period after which the rule’s 
impacts should begin to be observable and evaluation would be 
appropriate; and (d) sources of variation and possible research strategies 
or designs, whether experimental or quasi-experimental, that could take 
advantage, at the appropriate time, of that variation to try to draw 
inferences of the rule’s impacts.136  OIRA could establish guidelines for 
appropriate research designs and other plan features, which could be 
instructive for independent agencies, even if not binding.137 
In 2015, Senator Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) introduced the Smarter 
Regs Act, which would amend the Administrative Procedure Act to 
require that when agencies propose a major rule—that is, one with 
annual economic effects greater than $100 million—they also “include 
a potential framework for assessing the major rule, which shall include 
a general statement of how the agency intends to measure the 
effectiveness of the major rule.”138  The bill—which would apply to 
both executive and independent agencies—would then require 
agencies to follow through with their plans and conduct assessments 
of major rules in accordance with the time intervals and methods 
provided in the agencies’ published frameworks.139  Even without 
requiring these follow-on assessments, the mere process of developing 
evaluation plans at the outset of a rulemaking could help reinforce an 
                                               
 134. See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 48, at 194 (reporting that the quality of regulatory 
impact analyses across different administrations shows “a great deal of variation”). 
 135. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 62 (“An evaluation plan would constitute only a 
small part of an overall [regulatory impact analysis], and it would be non-binding in 
the sense that an agency would not be obligated to carry out the plan.”). 
 136. For a helpful discussion of agency options for the use of experimental and 
quasi-experimental research designs to learn about the impact of their regulations, see 
Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Learning from Regulatory Experience, supra note 117. 
 137. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 62–63. 
 138. Smarter Regs Act of 2015, S. 1817, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 139. See id. 
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evaluation culture within agencies as well as provide useful guidance 
for future evaluation of the rule by outside evaluators and the public.140 
C. Invest in Regulatory Evaluation and Related Research  
in Behavioral and Regulatory Science 
Taking retrospective review seriously demands resources:  time, 
personnel, and funding.141  Limitations in resources present tradeoffs 
between the breadth and depth of retrospective analysis.  From 2011 to 
2016, the Obama Administration’s lookback initiative took retrospective 
review seriously by generally favoring breadth (number of rules reviewed) 
over depth (the empirical rigor and sophistication of the underlying 
reviews).142  By some estimates, executive branch agencies conducted 
more than 800 retrospective regulatory reviews during this time period.143  
That means that the average executive branch agency reportedly 
undertook about thirty reviews, or about six per year, although a few 
agencies reviewed over fifty rules, or more than eight per year.144  Most of 
                                               
 140. Planning for evaluation at the outset would be consistent with the Evidence-Based 
Policymaking Commission Act of 2016’s goal of finding ways “to incorporate outcomes 
measurement . . . and rigorous impact analysis into program design.”  Evidence-Based 
Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-140, § 4(a)(3), 130 Stat. 317, 318. 
 141. Cf. COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE-
BASED POLICYMAKING 88 (2017), https://www.cep.gov/content/dam/cep/report/cep-
final-report.pdf (“Federal departments must enhance their capacity for evidence 
building to support the growth of evidence-based policymaking.”). 
 142. See ALDY, supra note 92, at 4–6 (stating that the Obama Administration focused 
on creating a culture of retrospective review but also left room for improvement in the 
quality and effectiveness of those reviews). 
 143. The Obama Administration’s final reporting on its lookback initiative claimed 
“more than 800 retrospective review initiatives the agencies have identified as 
complete.”  Shelanski, supra note 91.  My independent count of the entries listed in 
the final July 2016 updates submitted by the twenty-six agencies actually yields fewer 
than 800 regulatory initiatives, especially because some entries were for reviews of 
information collection requests and other non-rule reviews.  Connor Raso has 
reported that, as of the July 2016 updates, twenty-two executive agencies had listed 459 
planned retrospective reviews and 238 completed reviews—for a total of 697 reviews.  
Connor Raso, Assessing Regulatory Retrospective Review Under the Obama Administration, 
BROOKINGS (June 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/assessing-regulatory- 
retrospective-review-under-the-obama-administration. 
 144. Twenty-six executive departments and agencies filed reports indicating that 
they had conducted retrospective reviews.  Retrospective Review of Regulations, OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-
reform (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  The averages reported in the text are estimates based 
dividing roughly 800 reviews by twenty-six.  Raso, supra note 143.  In addition to 
recognizing that these numbers are at best rough estimates, it should be noted that 
they only apply to executive branch agencies.  Id.  Shortly after it launched its lookback 
initiative in 2011, the Obama Administration did initially prompt some independent 
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these reviews appear to have relied mainly on expert judgments, 
impressions, and assumptions.145  Few, if any, reviews involved in-depth 
empirical evaluation of the kind needed to draw valid inferences about 
what impacts the regulation under review actually may have caused.146 
The back-of-the-envelope nature of most of the Obama 
Administration’s retrospective reviews is hardly an intrinsic flaw.  Building 
a portfolio of reviews that favor breadth over depth is certainly better than 
not looking back at all.  Even quick glances back in the rearview mirror 
can be helpful.  Moreover, an agency presumably does not need a 
randomized controlled experiment, for example, to surmise that replacing 
paper filings with electronic filings will save processing time and money.  
Yet, a retrospective review portfolio devoid of any in-depth evaluation 
research misses a critical opportunity to draw a causal connection between 
regulations and intended as well as unintended benefits and costs.147  
Regulations, after all, aim at causation.  They seek to change behavior of 
regulated entities in ways that reduce or solve problems.  To look back 
without trying to make any causal inferences is to miss learning whether 
regulations are accomplishing what they are supposed to accomplish—as 
well as whether they might be causing new problems altogether. 
For these reasons, agencies need to conduct some retrospective 
analysis that draws causal inferences about their regulation.  They need 
to engage in evaluations that compare the world with a regulation to a 
counterfactual world without that regulation.  Since counterfactuals 
cannot be directly observed, agency evaluators must estimate them by 
using careful research designs, such as randomized controlled 
experiments, or by deploying various statistical techniques that 
effectively approximate randomized experiments.148  Such research can 
take time and effort to design and conduct. 
                                               
agencies to submit plans for retrospective reviews.  Exec. Order 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 
(2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 817–18 (2012); see also ALDY, supra 
note 92, at 42–43, 45.  But the independent agencies were not required to submit updates 
or progress reports on their plans, so a compilation or other ready source of the number 
of retrospective reviews actually conducted by independent agencies is not available. 
 145. See, e.g., ALDY, supra note 92, at 52 (“The vast majority of status updates on agencies’ 
retrospective review programs do not include evidence of formal retrospective analysis . . . .”). 
 146. Id.  Aldy also notes the “short time-frame” the Obama lookback initiative afforded 
agencies to develop plans for and report on their reviews, a time-frame indicative of the 
cursory nature of the so-called analysis underlying agencies’ efforts.  Id. at 51. 
 147. See Coglianese, supra note 117, at 300 (urging agencies to perform “causal attribution 
evaluation” for at least some regulations to understand more than actions or outcomes alone). 
 148. COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE, supra note 9, at 38–39 
(highlighting statistical strategies that “can be used to estimate the counterfactual and 
compare it with the existing state of the world”).  See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & 
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In building a portfolio of retrospective reviews, regulatory officials 
need to make choices based on available resources.  Not every rule will 
necessarily require rigorous, in-depth evaluation.  Banning the use of 
lead as an additive in gasoline, for example, might not demand a 
sophisticated evaluation to validate that such a rule caused observed 
declines in air concentrations of lead, especially if few or no other 
major sources of lead emissions exist.149  In many instances, though, it 
will be important to determine what the actual benefits and costs of a 
rule have been.  Those benefits and costs, if properly monetized, 
represent the value of the negative and positive impacts that the rule 
has caused.  Axiomatically, the only way to know what difference a 
regulation may be making—whether for good or for ill—is to conduct 
a careful, causally-oriented evaluation.150 
Even when agencies are selective and strategic in choosing rules to assess 
retrospectively, conducting rigorous evaluations will require adequate 
resources.  For some government agencies, these costs may be quite 
palpable and Congress will need to ensure agencies have appropriate 
budgetary resources.  The needed resources, though, will almost always 
amount to only a tiny fraction of overall estimated costs and benefits of the 
rules themselves, especially when evaluations are targeted toward major 
regulations.  From the standpoint of overall social welfare, investing in 
evaluation is worthwhile if it provides decision makers with options to lessen 
the costs or increase the benefits of major regulations even modestly. 
Congress might also consider ways that research capacities available at 
other institutions—for example, at the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine or the National Science Foundation—might 
be used to help support the evaluation of independent agencies’ 
regulations.  Other institutions could undertake or fund such research 
directly, or they could provide more fundamental research in behavioral 
sciences that indirectly helps to inform retrospective analysis.  These efforts 
                                               
Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 29 (Francisco Parisi ed., 2017); JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, 
MASTERING METRICS:  THE PATH FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT (2015). 
 149. Even if there were other sources, the pathways from fuel combustion to air 
levels of lead may be sufficiently well-understood, and the adverse health effects of lead 
so significant, that even a modest reduction from the air would still dwarf any adverse 
effects of a ban, making an investment in causally-oriented evaluation seem less urgent.  
Gaining a better understanding of other effects of a ban on lead additives, however, 
would still necessitate causally-oriented evaluation, such as if it were thought 
meaningful to know how the ban may have affected vehicle engine design and 
performance, as such outcomes are almost certainly affected by other factors. 
 150. See COGLIANESE, supra note 17, at 66. 
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could improve regulatory decisions by enhancing regulators’ understanding 
of how and why different regulations have the effects they do. 
CONCLUSION 
Improving the quality of regulatory analysis remains an ongoing 
challenge for all agencies.  When it comes to independent agencies, it is 
clear that requirements for high quality analysis—whether prospective or 
retrospective—do not apply to these agencies as they do to executive 
agencies.151  And yet the regulations that independent agencies adopt show 
no meaningful disparity in substantive significance that would justify 
continuing to exempt them entirely from analytic requirements.152  
Independent agencies’ regulations are in fact highly consequential to the 
economy and to overall societal well-being. 
Closing the gap in the treatment of independent and executive agencies’ 
analyses would be feasible using options outlined in this Article.  By taking 
actions such as those presented here, Congress could encourage the heads 
of independent agencies to improve their agencies’ regulatory analyses and 
ultimately produce smarter regulatory decisions—even without causing any 
dramatic diminution in independent agencies’ core autonomy.  Taking 
steps such as those discussed here would enhance the incentives for agency 
decision makers to look carefully before they leap, as well as to ensure that 
they look backwards from time to time to learn how well existing 
regulations are working.  Improving the quality of regulations issued by 
independent agencies ultimately depends on improving the quality of, and 
reliance on, both prospective and retrospective regulatory analysis. 
                                               
 151. See supra notes 2–3. 
 152. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
